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Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)—mortgages with 
monthly payments that fluctuate with changes in interest 
rates—began to be widely issued after 1982. About this 
same time, housing activity rebounded at an unexpect-
edly healthy clip despite historically high nominal interest 
rates. Noting the coincidence of the growth of ARMs and 
the unexpectedly strong housing activity, many observers 
concluded that the widespread use of ARMs was primar-
ily responsible for the strong 1982-84 housing activity. In 
this paper we argue, however, that there was little or no 
causal relationship between growing ARM issuance and 
the strong housing activity.
1 After providing some back-
ground, we question the argument made by those ob-
servers who attach critical importance to ARMs for 
stimulating the strong housing activity. We then suggest 
that ARMs became popular because they allow in-
creased market efficiency; that is, ARMs permit bor-
rowers and lenders to better share risks associated with 
fluctuating incomes and interest rates. Finally, using a 
statistically based forecasting model of housing activity, 
we provide some empirical evidence indicating that the 
housing spurt would have been about as strong without 
ARMs. The model finds that although nominal fixed rate 
mortgage (FRM) interest rates were high, effects asso-
ciated with their decline during this period adequately 
account for most of the 1982-84 pickup in housing 
activity. 
Background 
Having been legalized nationally for federally chartered 
savings and loan institutions in 1981, ARMs began to be 
widely used to finance home purchases after 1982. By the 
end of 1982, an estimated $65 billion of ARMs were 
outstanding at major financial institutions. In 1983 alone, 
an estimated additional $39 billion of ARMs were added 
to this stock, accounting for one-third of the net growth of 
outstanding mortgage debt that year (Nothaft 1984, p. 
448). In 1984, ARMs continued to be used heavily, 
accounting for around 60 percent of all conventional 
(non-FHA and -VA) home mortgage loans closed. 
After 1982, housing activity also grew at a healthy 
clip, even though nominal interest rates were high com-
pared with their historical average. Single-family housing 
starts, for example, grew from a seasonally adjusted 
annual rate of over 500,000 units in January 1982 to 
around 1 million in September 1984, reaching a high of 
about 1.3 million in February 1984. This growth oc-
curred at a time when effective interest rates on conven-
tional FRMs for newly built homes fell from a high of 
nearly 16 percent in May 1982 but never dropped below 
12^ percent.
2 
The rapid rate at which housing grew caught many 
analysts by surprise. For example, Goodman (1985, p. 1, 
n. 2) notes that "the average housing starts forecast for 
1983 of 18 organizations polled by U.S. Gypsum 
Company at the beginning of 1983 was 1.44 million units. 
1 Similar conclusions have been reached by Esaki and Wachtenheim (1984-
85) and Palash and Stoddard (forthcoming), although their methods differ from 
ours. 
2The May figure includes some ARMs because a separate data series wasn't 
kept for them until July 1982. 
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Actual starts that year were 1.70 million." Similarly, 
Blue Chip Economic Indicators reported consensus 
forecasts for housing starts almost as low. And a single-
family housing forecast we constructed for this study 
would have underpredicted seasonally adjusted housing 
starts during both 1983 and 1984. 
Noting that the growth of ARM use and the unexpect-
edly strong housing recovery concurred despite histori-
cally high FRM rates, some observers concluded that the 
advent of ARMs was responsible for the strong housing 
recovery. Trade publications printed stories asserting that 
ARMs were a major factor in increasing housing activity. 
One typical story quoted Paul W. Prior, chairman of the 
U.S. League of Savings Institutions: "There would be no 
housing activity to speak of without ARMs If home 
lending institutions could not make adjustable rate mort-
gages, we'd be forced to abandon housing just to survive 
in a deregulated savings world" (ARMs are the muscle 
behind housing, 1984, p. 45). 
An Argument About ARMs . . . 
Observers attributing critical importance to ARMs' role 
in the housing upswing often make the following argu-
ment. They assume that because the initial effective 
interest rates on ARMs (rates including fees and charges) 
were lower than those on FRMs, prospective home 
buyers might have wanted to buy higher-priced homes 
and/or a greater number of homes than they would have if 
ARMs weren't permitted (see Chart 1). These observers 
Chart 1 
Mortgage Interest Rates for ARMs and FRMs* 
(July 1982-October 1984) 
1982 1983 1984 
'Average initial effective interest rates on conventional mortgages 
Source: FHLBB, various dates 
Chart 2 
ARMs' Share of Conventional Mortgages Issued 
(July 1982-October 1984) 
Source: FHLBB, various dates 
also believe that lenders were willing to accommodate 
buyers' plans to purchase more homes and/or higher-
priced homes. The observers argue that to accommodate 
the purported higher housing demand, lenders would have 
applied similar loan qualification standards to ARM 
borrowers as they did to FRM borrowers, so that 
borrowers would indeed qualify for higher-priced homes 
if financed by ARMs rather than FRMs. As evidence that 
such accommodation occurred, observers cite the grow-
ing share that ARMs captured of conventional mortgage 
lending (see Chart 2). 
. . . And Some Reasons to Doubt It 
At least two reasons exist for doubting the argument 
observers use to attribute such critical importance to 
ARMs' role in the 1982-84 increase in housing activity: 
The first reason questions the assumption that borrowers 
took much advantage of ARMs' increased borrowing 
power. The second stresses that factors other than how 
borrowers perceive the costs of ARMs should be con-
sidered before attributing critical importance to ARMs. 
Borrowers Didn't Take Full Advantage 
of ARMs' Borrowing Power 
First, it is not fair to assume that borrowers as a group 
took full advantage of the increased borrowing power 
11 attributed to ARMs' lower initial effective interest rates (a 
point also noted in Goodman 1985, pp. 5-6). If bor-
rowers had taken much advantage of the higher borrowing 
power inherent in the observers' argument that similar 
lending criteria apply to ARMs and FRMs, we would 
expect buyers' housing expense to income ratios to have 
remained roughly constant during this period. Instead, 
these ratios generally fell. The 1983 Home Buyer Survey 
shows that buyers generally spent less on housing as a 
fraction of their incomes in 1983 than in 1981 and 1979 
(U.S. League of Savings Institutions 1984).
3 In partic-
ular, the median housing expense to income ratio for 
1983 buyers was 23.1 percent, compared to 24.1 percent 
for 1981 buyers and to 24.3 percent for 1979 buyers. 
Moreover, the percentage of buyers spending only 20 
percent or less of their incomes on housing rose from 28.5 
percent in 1979 to 30.6 percent in 1981, then rose again 
sharply to 37.3 percent in 1983. With willing lenders, 
these buyers presumably could have qualified for larger 
mortgages if they had wanted, but evidently they did not. 
Data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics also 
support the conclusion that home buyers typically don't 
take the biggest mortgage that lenders would allow them 
(Boehm and McKenzie 1983, p. 290, Table 1). 
So why didn't borrowers take much advantage of the 
possible increased borrowing power of ARMs? They 
may not have due to the additional risk incurred by the 
possibility of interest-rate-induced payment fluctuations. 
One obvious source of risk is the possibility that the 
present value of mortgage payments (that is, the value of 
future payments in today's terms) would be higher with an 
ARM than with an FRM. Furthermore, we have theoret-
ically shown that borrowers' evaluations of ARMs 
relative to FRMs depend not only on the present value of 
their expected payment streams but also on another 
source of risk: the correlation of borrowers' incomes with 
interest-rate movements and resulting mortgage pay-
ments (see Stutzer and Roberds 1985, Subsection IB). 
According to our theory, even if some borrowers expect 
the present value of ARM payments to equal that of FRM 
payments, they will still value the FRM more than the 
ARM if they expect their incomes to be low when the 
ARM interest rate (and related mortgage payment) is 
high—that is, if they think their incomes and ARM 
interest rates will be negatively correlated. And this result 
favoring FRMs over ARMs (with expected payments of 
equivalent present value) holds even though the model 
assumes FRMs can't be refinanced with a new FRM 
when current rates fall below the previously contracted 
rate. This assumption forces FRM borrowers to risk not 
being able to take advantage of lower future interest rates. 
Other Factors Were Involved: 
Improved Efficiency 
A second reason to doubt the importance of ARMs in the 
housing upswing is that factors other than how borrowers 
perceive the costs of ARMs can affect the amount of 
housing demanded. For example, the disposable incomes 
of buyers and lenders, as well as lenders' aversion to 
interest-rate risk, eventually affect the amount of housing 
demanded.
4 Using a simple economic theory of incom-
plete markets, we have demonstrated the possibility that 
these other factors could combine in such a way as to 
nullify any effect that the authorization of ARMs would 
have on the amount of housing demanded (see Stutzer 
and Roberds 1985, Subsection 1C). According to this 
theory, rather than to increase housing demand, ARMs 
are issued and held to help lenders and borrowers hedge 
against future fluctuations in incomes and interest rates. 
Because the theory assumes that borrowers and lenders 
who voluntarily agree to ARMs are well-informed about 
the risks entailed, the authorization of ARMs potentially 
improves the efficiency by which risks associated with 
income and interest-rate fluctuations are allocated. This 
potential for improved efficiency (that is, the potential for 
both borrowers and lenders to be made better off) creates 
the major need for and effect of ARM use. 
How can ARMs improve the efficiency of risk alloca-
tion between borrowers and lenders? When interest rates 
and mortgage payments decline, ARMs benefit borrow-
ers because ARMs pass these declines along without 
forcing borrowers to incur the cost of refinancing an 
FRM. And when interest rates and payments increase, 
borrowers whose incomes also increase (that is, whose 
incomes are positively correlated with interest rates) will 
3These data were gathered from 371 member institutions of the U.S. League 
of Savings Institutions. Other lenders may have had different experiences. 
4 Another possible reason for doubting that ARMs are a major factor in the 
growth of housing activity is that lenders may view ARMs as rislder than FRMs 
and therefore adopt lending and pricing policies which partially nullify the impact 
of lower initial ARM rates. Lenders may believe that ARMs will generate less 
income in periods of declining interest rates than would FRMs with typical 
refinancing options. Or lenders may believe that ARMs carry higher default risks 
than FRMs. Either belief or both may lead lenders to make pricing and lending 
decisions in a way that dampens the impact ARMs have on housing activity. 
However, while the view that lenders perceive ARMs as riskier than FRMs 
may have some credence, we have seen little evidence that lenders exercised this 
restraint in 1982 or through most of 1983. Later in 1984, though, major mortgage 
insurers sharply raised premiums on insured ARMs, forcing lenders' ARM pricing 
upward. Also, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 
tightened its standards for purchasing ARMs from original lenders, thus forcing 
some lenders to tighten their lending criteria. In August 1985, the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) also tightened its standards for 
purchasing ARMs from original lenders. So even if risk-induced lender restraint 
wasn't a factor in limiting ARMs' impact on housing activity before 1984, it 
probably has become a factor since then. 
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be hurt less when using ARMs. It is thus conceivable that 
many ARM borrowers will be made better off over the life 
of their mortgages as interest rates and payments fluctu-
ate: the benefits accrued when interest rates and mortgage 
payments are lower may outweigh the costs incurred 
when rates and payments are higher. Lenders, in turn, are 
more likely to be made better off by issuing ARMs when 
their sources of loanable funds are predominantly short-
term funds sensitive to interest-rate movements, as are 
most deposits. ARMs help these lenders reduce the risk of 
interest-rate fluctuations in two related ways. First, 
ARMs help them better match interest-rate-induced 
fluctuations in their costs of funds with the revenues 
earned from their mortgage holdings, thus reducing their 
profit risk. Second, ARMs help lenders reduce the risk 
that higher interest rates will erode the market resale value 
of their mortgage holdings, as happened with FRMs. 
The prospects for improved efficiency make ARMs 
socially desirable, regardless of whether or not they 
substantially increase housing activity. That ARMs were 
intended to play a role in improving efficiency is sug-
gested by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's April 
1981 authorization of ARMs in order to " allow the lender 
and the borrower the flexibility to agree upon the terms 
that will best suit their individual needs" (Amendment 
adopted ..., 1981, p. 54). Our results help confirm that 
this purpose has been fulfilled. 
In summary, we have suggested some reasons to doubt 
the argument that the ascension of ARM financing, with 
initial interest rates lower than FRM financing, was a 
major cause of the concurrent rapid growth of housing 
activity since 1982. Instead, the motivation behind and 
end result of the widespread issuance of ARMs may have 
been to improve the efficiency of risk allocation between 
borrowers and lenders. 
If Not ARMs, Then What? 
Because we doubt that ARM financing was a major factor 
in the 1982-84 growth of housing activity, an obvious 
question arises: What were major factors behind this 
growth? To help answer this question we constructed a 
simple statistical forecasting model of housing activity. 
After describing the model briefly (see Appendix A for 
details), we use it to support our hypothesis that ARMs 
were not a major factor in the housing upswing and to 
suggest that a major reason for the growth of housing 
activity in 1982-84 was effects associated with the 
general decline of FRM rates over 1982 and 1983 
(shown in Chart 1). Specifically, we use the forecasting 
model to demonstrate that advance knowledge of actual 
FRM rates between January 1982 and October 1984 
would have allowed us to forecast most of the actual 
growth in single-family housing starts and prices during 
this period—without knowing anything at all about ARM 
use. This suggests that if ARMs had not been permitted, 
more FRM lending and/or creative financing would have 
occurred to enable most of the growth in housing activity.
5 
Our Model of Housing Activity 
Our forecasting model of housing activity uses the 
Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) methodology 
(described in Litterman 1985). Our BVAR forecasts 
initially included four monthly data series for the period 
January 1964-October 1984—the earliest and latest 
dates for which data were available. The series chosen 
were 
•Privately owned single-family housing starts, taken 
as a measure of single-family housing market activity. 
• The real median price of new single-family houses, 
used as an indicator of the inflation-adjusted average 
price of new homes sold; published in nominal form, 
the series was deflated using the consumer price 
index. 
• The average effective interest rate for conventional 
mortgages on new houses, used as an index of 
mortgage interest rates. We also made use of the 
separate series, first available in July 1982, for the 
fixed and adjustable rate components of this average. 
We assumed that before July 1982, the average rate 
series and fixed rate series coincide. 
•The percentage change (difference in natural loga-
rithms) in the consumer price index (CPI), used as a 
measure of inflation. 
We chose these four series not just for their power in 
forecasting housing activity but also to help us test 
whether or not ARMs were a significant factor in the 
rapid growth. (Further details about the data series are 
given in Appendix A.) 
To help test for the possible effect of ARM financing 
on the level of housing starts, we first made two sets of 
forecasts for single-family housing starts and prices, both 
covering the period January 1982-October 1984 (see 
Charts 3 and 4). The first set includes forecasts that could 
have been made on December 1981; these forecasts only 
use data from December 1981 or earlier, before the large 
increase in ARM use. The forecasts from this set are 
5 By creative financing we mean a number of techniques borrowers and sellers 
adopt, in conjunction with FRMs, to help finance home sales. Such techniques 
include the use of contracts for deed and builder buydowns of FRM rates. 
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Our Model's Forecasts of Housing Activity* 
Chart 3 Housing Starts t 
Mil. Units 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 











t Median sale price of new privately owned single-family houses, deflated by the consumer price index (1967 = 100) 
"The unconditional forecasts use pre-ARMs data from January 1964 to December 1981; the conditional forecasts use 
the same data plus actual data for FRM rates from January 1982 to October 1984. 
Sources of basic data: FHLBB, various dates; U.S. Department of Commerce 
$ Chart 4 Housing Prices * 
$) 
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termed unconditional forecasts. The second set of fore-
casts uses all the data available for the first set plus the 
actual data for FRM rates between January 1982 and 
October 1984, when ARM use and housing activity grew 
rapidly. These forecasts are termed conditionalforecasts 
because they are conditioned on future information—in 
this case, post-1981 FRM rates. These conditional 
forecasts show how much better the unconditional fore-
casts could have been if the future (January 1982-
October 1984) FRM rates had been known. 
Our Two Comparisons 
We then used the unconditional and conditional forecasts 
to make two comparisons. The first compares the condi-
tional to the unconditional forecasts to give an indication 
of the impact that falling FRM rates had on the post-1981 
performance of housing starts and prices. The second 
compares the conditional forecasts to the actual data on 
housing starts and prices; this provides information about 
the effects that additional factors, including ARMs, may 
have had on housing starts and prices. 
Our two comparisons are perhaps best explained by 
using a simple equation. Let A denote what we are trying 
to forecast—for instance, housing starts in February 
1983. Let U denote the unconditional forecast and C 
denote the conditional forecast of A. Then, the error of 
the unconditional forecast, (A — [/), can be written as 
(A - U) = (C - U) + (A - C). 
That is, the error of the unconditional forecast is always 
equal to the difference between the conditional and 
unconditional forecasts, (C — U), plus the error of the 
conditional forecast, (A — C). The difference (C — U) 
represents the impact of the additional information used 
to make the conditional forecasts. In our first comparison, 
this difference is attributed to the impact of unanticipated 
changes in FRM rates. In our second comparison, we 
examine the difference (A — C). Due to the influence of 
additional factors other than FRMs, such as demographic 
factors, we would not expect (A — C) to be zero even if 
ARMs had never existed. However, if the conditional 
forecast errors were unusually large or persistent, this 
would suggest that ARMs, perhaps in conjunction with 
these other non-FRM factors, had a significant impact on 
housing activity over the forecast period.
6 If the condi-
tional forecast errors were fairly small and infrequent, this 
would suggest that neither ARMs nor these additional 
factors were major contributors to the housing upswing. 
Our Results 
The results of our first comparison, made by comparing 
the year-end 1981 conditional forecast (conditioned on 
actual post-1981 FRM rates) with the unconditional 
forecast, can be seen in Charts 3 and 4. This comparison 
shows how much higher and more accurately the model 
would have forecasted both single-family housing starts 
and real median home prices if the actual, post-1981 
declining path of FRM rates had been known then. Since 
the conditional forecast is far more accurate than the 
unconditional one, it is evident that much information 
useful for accurately forecasting housing starts and prices 
is available from the actual fall in FRM rates—a fall 
which our model didn't predict. 
The results of our second comparison, between the 
conditional forecasts and actual data shown in Charts 3 
and 4, are that the conditional forecast doesn't systemati-
cally over- or underpredict either housing starts or prices 
during the 1982-1984 period. Because we do not find 
particularly large or persistent errors in the conditional 
forecasts, we can tentatively conclude that neither 
ARMs nor other non-FRM factors were major contrib-
utors to the unexpectedly strong housing recovery. 
Of course, including other non-FRM factors in the 
model may help track housing starts and prices better. But 
since the conditional forecast error (A — C) is already 
relatively modest, the slight increase in forecast accuracy 
earned by including other factors probably wouldn't 
justify attributing major significance to them. 
Another Test 
Even so, we decided to test if the inclusion of another 
factor might substantially better the model's prediction of 
housing activity. We tried exchanging a U.S. personal 
income series for the model's inflation rate (CPI) series 
(which we dropped to conserve degrees of freedom in 
estimation), reasoning that anticipated growth in personal 
income, after the nation's recession bottomed out in 
November 1982, might have been a factor in the 
subsequent strong housing activity. However, the result 
of our test (shown in Chart 5) indicates that the new 
conditional forecast for single-family housing starts (con-
ditioned on both FRM rates and personal income) is 
slightly lower and only somewhat more accurate than the 
old conditional forecast (conditioned only on FRM 
rates). We thus conclude that possibly higher-than-
expected income growth probably wasn't a major factor 
in the unexpectedly strong housing activity: knowledge of 
6It is possible that the presence of ARMs may have caused FRM rates to be 
lower than they otherwise would have been. If so, ARMs may also have 
(indirectly) influenced our first comparison—the difference (C — U). But given the 
short length of the separate monthly interest-rate series (post-July 1982), we can't 
reliably test the hypothesis that ARMs' presence lowered FRM rates. 
15 Chart 5 
Including a Personal Income Series 
in the Model's Conditional Forecast of Housing Starts* 
Mil. Units 
*The housing start series and conditional forecast are the same as shown on Chart 3. The new conditional forecast is 
conditioned on FRM rates and U.S. personal income from January 1982 to October 1984. 
Sources of basic data: FHLBB, various dates; U.S. Department of Commerce 
actual income growth helped better predict housing 
growth, but not substantially so.
7 
Summary 
Although the use of ARMs grew concurrently with 
housing activity between 1982 and 1984, we doubt that 
the former growth caused the latter. Rather than increas-
ing housing activity, the growth of ARMs can primarily 
be explained by their role in helping borrowers and 
lenders better share risks associated with future fluctua-
tions of interest rates and incomes. As such, ARMs are 
socially desirable regardless of whether or not they help 
spur housing activity. This is consistent with the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board's rationale for authorizing 
ARMs to "allow the lender and the borrower the 
flexibility to agree upon the terms that will best suit their 
individual needs" (Amendment adopted . . . , 1981, p. 
54). We primarily attribute the 1982-84 growth of 
housing activity to effects associated with the decline of 
FRM rates between 1982 and 1983. Our findings suggest 
that if ARMs had not been available, more FRM lending 
or creative financing or both would have taken place to 
fuel the growth of housing activity. 
7Of course, lower interest rates (including FRM rates) may have helped 
predict the increase in housing activity because lower interest rates help cause 
higher personal income growth. If so, we wouldn't expect the inclusion of the 
personal income series to have improved the housing forecast. If this were the case, 
though, it is still reasonable to attribute the housing growth to the causative factor 
(lower interest rates) rather than to its effect (higher personal income growth). 
16 Michael J. Stutzer, William Roberds 
Adjustable Rate Mortgages 
Appendix A 
The Bayesian Vector 
Autoregression Technique 
In this appendix we describe the Bayesian vector autoregres-
sion (B VAR) technique used to construct our unconditional and 
conditional forecasts of housing activity. We discuss the 
technique's advantages and disadvantages, describe the four 
time series included in the model, and evaluate the model's 
forecasting performance. 
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with the 
BVAR technique. The principal advantage is that the technique 
typically yields relatively good forecasts given relatively small 
inputs of human and computer time. For the purposes of our 
study, the major disadvantage is that the BVAR technique is a 
purely statistical one. While projections from BVAR models 
may be reasonably accurate, assigning unambiguous economic 
interpretations to these projections is often an elusive task. 
Despite this serious limitation, we feel that the BVAR 
technique represents the best available methodology for the 
present study. Widely used alternative forecasting techniques 
include Box-Jenkins (univariate autoregressive moving average 
time series models) and structural econometric models. Box-
Jenkins models, while simple to construct and estimate, use data 
only on one time series; as such, these models are of no use in 
constructing conditional forecasts. Structural models, based on 
economic theory, are preferable to BVAR models in the sense 
that it is easier to give economic meaning to their projections. 
However, constructing a structural model that is both theoret-
ically and empirically valid can be a difficult and time-
consuming task. For the purposes of preliminary data analysis, 
the BVAR technique might be thought of as a practical 
compromise between the two alternative techniques. 
Accordingly, we estimated a four-variable (or four-equation) 
BVAR model for the following monthly data series: 
1. Private single-family housing starts, monthly rate. 
2. Median sale price of new privately owned single-family 
houses, thousands of current dollars. 
3. National average effective interest rate on conventional 
mortgages for purchase of new homes, percent per year. 
After June 1982, the fixed and adjustable rate compo-
nents of this series are available separately. 
4. Consumer price index (CPI, 1967 = 100). 
The source of series 1-3 was the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (FHLBB, various dates) and of series 4, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Series 1, 2, and 4 were seasonally 
adjusted using a procedure described in Amirizadeh 1985. 
Efficient seasonal adjustment of a quantity xt (say, housing 
starts in January 1982) generally involves knowledge of future 
values of xt (that is, housing starts in February 1982, March 
1982, and so forth). For this reason, the forecasts reported in 
our study tend to be more accurate than those actually made 
over the forecast period (January 1982-October 1984). Each 
equation included 15 lags of all variables and a constant term. 
All series except the inflation series (CPI) were first converted 
Theil U Statistics for the BVAR Model Forecasts* 
(January 1976-December 1981) 
Forecast (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interval Single-Family Real Median Price Fixed Consumer Price Number of 
(months) Housing Starts New Single-Family Homes Mortgage Rates Index Observations 
1  1.014  .9303  .9726  .8950  61 
2  1.017  .9351  .9882  .8980  60 
3  1.031  .9617  1.0307  .8486  59 
4  1.030  .9658  1.0090  .7866  58 
5  1.018  .9896  .9634  .7735  57 
6  1.008  .9880  .8749  .7479  56 
7  1.001  .9955  .7738  .7757  55 
8  1.002  1.0007  .7124  .7776  54 
9  1.002  .9603  .6256  .8204  53 
10  1.009  .9398  .6095  .8155  52 
11  1.021  .9378  .6053  .8122  51 
12  1.041  .9577  .6083  .7646  50 
'Theil U statistics report the ratio of the root mean square error (RMSE) of the BVAR model's forecast 
to the RMSE of a naive forecast of no change in the (natural logarithms of the) series. 
17 to natural logarithms. In the terminology of Doan and Litterman 
(1984), we placed a fairly "tight" prior over the model 
parameters. These priors were chosen because we felt that (the 
logarithms of) each of the four series could be approximated 
reasonably well as a random walk or as a random walk with 
drift. 
The next step was to validate the model. To do so, we 
evaluated the out-of-sample (unconditional) forecasting per-
formance of the model over the period January 1976 to 
December 1981. This was done for forecast intervals of 1 to 12 
months. To avoid anticipating the effects of ARMs, no data 
from January 1982 or later were used in the evaluation. 
Overall, the results of this evaluation indicate that our model 
performs at an acceptable level. Of particular interest are the 
Theil U statistics (see the table on page 17). These statistics 
report the ratio of the root mean square error (RMSE) of the 
model's forecast to the RMSE of a naive forecast of no change 
in the (natural logarithms of the) series. Except for housing 
starts, almost all of the Theil U statistics are below one; this 
indicates that our model outperforms the naive forecasting 
procedure. Unfortunately, in the case of housing starts, our 
model performs only about as accurately as the naive pro-
cedure, at least in terms of unconditional forecasts. 
Experimentation suggests that our model's performance in 
predicting housing starts could be slightly improved by adding a 
short-term interest rate variable, such as a T-bill rate, as an 
exogenous variable in the VAR system. Our subsequent 
conditional forecasting experiments suggest, however, that this 
increase in forecast accuracy would largely be due to better 
unconditional forecasts of mortgage rates. (See Appendix B for 
details on how the conditional forecasts were made.) It is thus 
unlikely our conditional forecasts would be strongly affected by 
this complication. With the goal of keeping our study inexpen-
sive, simple, and easily duplicable, we decided against con-
structing a more complicated model. 
Ideally, our study also would have covered a greater number 
of indicators of housing sector activity. Increasing the number of 
series to be modeled by the BVAR technique, however, makes 
both forecasting and interpretation of BVAR models more 
difficult. Construction of a large BVAR model necessarily 
involves making some arbitrary modeling decisions inappro-
priate to the preliminary nature of our study. So we restricted 
our attention to two of the most widely followed aggregates: 
single-family housing starts and (real) median single-family 
home prices. 
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Appendix B 
Unconditional and Conditional Forecasting 
With Vector Autoregression Models 
This appendix provides a shortened version of a presentation of 
unconditional and conditional forecasting with vector auto-
regression (VAR) models in Doan, Litterman, and Sims 1984. 
The notation used is that of Sargent 1979, Chapter 10. (For an 
extensive discussion of forecasting with time series models, see 
Sargent 1979, Chapter 12.) 
Consider an iV-variate process xt with the known VAR 
representation 
(1) A(L)xt = et 
where x, is an N X 1 vector, A(L) is an N X N polynomial 
matrix one-sided in nonnegative powers ofL, and et is a vector of 
white noises. 
Denote by Clt the set [xt, xt~\, . . .}. The unconditional 
forecast ofx[+k ,(ork> 0, is defined to be the linear least squares 
projection of xt+k on Clt, denoted 
(2) P[xt+k in,] 
or xt+k. It is well known that xt+k can be derived recursively by 
the formula 
(3) xt+k = -[A (L )/L]+xt+k-i 
where xt+k = xt+k, for k < 0, and where the notation [ ]+means 
ignore negative powers of L. 
Now let the vector x be defined by 
(4) [x',+i. . . xWK] 
for K > 1. The unconditional forecast P[x | fir] = x can be 
obtained by successive applications of formula (3). 
We now consider the conditional forecasting problem. 
Suppose that in addition to Clt, it is known that 
(5) R'x = r 
where R' is a known J X NK matrix of rank J, for J < NK, and 
r is a known / X 1 vector. The conditional forecasting problem 
is one of computing 
(6) P[x\Clt,R'x = r]. 
Since x is in the span of fl„ this is equivalent to calculating 
(7) P[(x-x)\ n„ R'(x-x) = r- R'x]. 
Defining v = x~x and r = r—R'x, the projection problem to be 
solved is that of calculating 
(8) P[v | ft„ R'v = r]. 
By the projection theorem (see Luenberger 1969, Chapter 3), 
the unconditional forecast error v is uncorrected with Clt. 
Hence projection (8) reduces to 
(9) P[v| R'v = r] 
which we designate as u*. 
By definition, u* solves the problem 
(10) min uE(y—u)'(y—u) 
subject to the constraint that R 'u = r. Problem (10) is equivalent 
to the problem 
(11) minw Ev'v + u'u 
subject to the constraint that R 'u = rt since u is nonstochastic 
and is v = 0. Since Ev'v does not depend on u, the last problem 
reduces to 
(12) minw u'u 
subject to the constraint that R 'u = r. Problem (12) has solution 
(13) u* = R(R'R)~
lr. 
The conditional forecast of x may then be recovered as 
(14) P[x |ft„ R'x = r]=x-h u\ 
The derivation provided is for a process xt with mean zero. 
The formulas can be easily extended to processes with nonzero 
means. 
To calculate our conditional forecasts, we used the RATS 
(regression analysis of time series) code given in Example 17.2 
of Doan and Litterman 1984, which solves the programming 
problem (12). Having estimated^ (L) using data onxt, xt~\,... 
(with t = December 1981), we then proceeded as iL4 (L) were 
known. Proceeding in this fashion ignores the impact of the 
additional information R'x = r on the estimate of A (L), but it 
saves significant amounts of computation time. 
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